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PARTNERSHIPS - CONTINUED LIABILITY OF A
RETIRING PARTNER RECEIVING PAYMENTS
by James H. Wallenstein
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A partner who retires usually seeks relief from his personal liabil-
ity on partnership obligations. For economic or tax reasons, he may
continue to receive payments from the firm rather than withdraw
his entire interest.' This Comment explores the effect of such pay-
ments on his liability for future partnership obligations.
Payment to a retiring partner for his interest in the partnership
is usually provided for in a retirement agreement.' The Internal
Revenue Code has labelled the two basic types of arrangements as
"sale" and "liquidation." "Sale" involves transfer for considera-
tion of the retiring partner's interest in the firm to one or more
remaining partners, or to a third person. "Liquidation" involves
transfer or surrender to and payment from the partnership itself.
In either case the parties may ease the burden and improve terms of
payment by delaying full payment. Moreover, continuing payments
under either plan may reduce income taxes for the retiring partner
or the continuing partners.'
No retirement agreement by itself can insulate the retiring partner
from debts existing at the time of retirement. Section 36 of the Uni-
form Partnership Act in expressing this rule' merely restates past
law." On the other hand, complete withdrawal including a lump-sum
payment for the retiring partner's interest should protect him from
1 Analysis in this article will be based upon the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 7 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. §§ 1-45 (1949), hereafter referred to as "the act" and cited by section. The
act was passed with few modifications by the 1961 Texas Legislature and is codified as TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Supp. 1965).
' See Bakst, Payments to a Retiring Partner or to a Deceased Partner's Successor in Inter-
est, N.Y.U. 19th INST. ON FED. TAX. 319 (1961); and Dauber, Partnership Reorganizations:
A New Tax Frontier, 64 DICK. L. REV. 95 (1959).
' Section 42 of the act allows a partner to retire without an agreement and later to re-
ceive his interest in the partnership plus either interest or profits attributable to that interest.
For an analysis of liability problems in connection with section 42 see Note, Profit Rights and
Creditors' Priorities after a Partner's Death or Retirement: Section 42 of the UPA, 63 YALE
L.J. 709 (1954).4 See Treas. Reg. § 1.736 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6832, 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 33,
at 22 and § 1.741 (1956), and note 2 supra.
5 See note 2 supra.
' "The dissolution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liability of
any partner." § 36(1) of the act. Section 36(2) expressly approves a novation agreement
among the retiring partner, the partnership, and the creditor.
7Shaw v. Green, 128 Tex. 596, 99 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Comm. App. 1937); Reed v.
Shaw, 274 S.W. 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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liability for future debts of the firm. When the retiring partner
accepts continuing payments, however, he may be held to have de-
layed complete withdrawal of his partnership interest. Thus, even
though he withdraws personally from management, he may subject
himself to continued partnership liability.
A quick glance at the rules of partnership is reassuring to a retir-
ing partner but perhaps misleading. Most cases indicate that any valid
retirement agreement among partners ends the partnership as to those
partners.! Moreover, although such cases deal with suits between
partners themselves, section 7 (1) of the act provides that in cases
not involving estoppel, "persons who are not partners as to each
other are not partners as to third parties."" It might seem that
courts would logically allow complete protection for retiring part-
ners with an express agreement.
Unfortunately, courts are either quick to find estoppel or slow to
give due respect to section 7 (1)11 and any indications of continuity
of the former partnership may prove costly to the retiring partner.
Signs of visible continuity include failure to give notice of retire-
ment and failure to withdraw the retiring partner's name from the
firm. These signs are common elements of estoppel to be avoided in
any retirement."
More subtle perhaps are the signs of economic continuity in the
form of continuing payments from the firm. "Liquidation" agree-
ments seem particularly vulnerable because the form of payment
may be quite similar to that under the former partnership. More-
over, the retiring partner in a liquidation is considered for tax pur-
poses as a partner until his interest has been fully liquidated." The
"sale" agreement, although ending economic continuity on the sur-
face, may not be totally immune, especially when partnership prop-
erty is used as security for payment. 4 Analysis in this Comment will
'This protection, however, can be shattered by estoppel. See specifically sections 16, 33,
34, and 35 of the act. See also Sher and Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 201h Cen-
tury-Why Texas Should Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263, 311 (1958).
°Sorokach v. Trusewich, 13 N.J. 363, 99 A.2d 790 (1953); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282
N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939); Sechrest v. Sechrest, 248 Wis. 516, 22 N.W.2d 594 (1946).
See also Annot., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1391, 1413 (1957); and Williams, The Uniform Partnership
Act Comes to Nebraska, 22 NEB. L. REv. 215, 247 (1943). Note that the continuing part-
ners may prevent by agreement problems associated with dissolution. Bromberg, Partnership
Dissolution-Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 631, 637-38 (1965).
10 Section 7 (1).
"Boone v. General Shoe Corp., 242 S.W.2d 138 (Ark. 1951); Mercer v. Vinson, 85
Ariz. 280, 336 P.2d 854 (1959); Gustafon v. Taber, 234 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1951).
1 See note 8 supra.
"aTreas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(ii) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6832, 1965 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 33, at 22.
14 For an example of how closely a "sale" can resemble a "liquidation," see David A.
Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 547-53 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
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assume circumstances under either a "liquidation" or border-line
"sale."
II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF PROFIT-SHARING
Profit-sharing is an essential element of partnership;" therefore, if
the retiring partner does not share in profits, he should not fear fu-
ture personal liability. " But the term "profit-sharing" is at least
arguably applicable to all continuing payments from a prospering
firm,' so the considerations in any retirement providing for continu-
ing payments include not only the existence of profit-sharing but
also the presumptions arising from profit-sharing.
A. What Constitutes Profit-Sharing?
Section 18(a) of the act indicates that standard profit-sharing
involves equal allocation of profits among partners. But all profit-
sharing is not necessarily equal,"8 and allocations of profits on any
percentage basis easily fall under the classfication of profit-sharing."
Likewise, agreements for payments of fixed sums plus a percentage
of the profits are considered profit-sharing." The latter form of
agreement arises frequently in retirements from professional and
other personal service firms where each partner's interest in the part-
nership is small in relation to the continuing income value of the
firm."
Agreements often call for payments only of fixed sums but with
some definite relation to the prosperity of the continuing firm. One
popular form requires payment of the retiring partner's interest in
the partnership plus fixed (although possibly diminishing) yearly
payments calculated as a percentage of his distributive share of
income at the time of retirement." Assuming no drastic change in
the income of the firm, these payments bear too close a resemblance
"Section 6(l): "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners for a profit." See also I ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP 163 (2d ed. 1960) indicating
that profit-sharing is the only essential element of partnership.
" This feeling of security, of course, should be tempered by a healthy awareness for
elements of estoppel. See note 8 and text accompanying note 10 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 18-29 infra.
Is Section 18: "The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall
be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules. (Em-
phasis added.)
19Hoist v. Butler, 379 Pa. 124, 108 A.2d 740 (1954) (24% - 24% - 24% - 151% -
8% division of profits); Blair v. Rindy, 358 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref.
n.r.e. (70% - 30% division of profits).
"0Blumberg v. Palm, 238 Minn. 249, 56 N.W.2d 412 (1953). See also Annot., 137
A.L.R. 6, 85 (1942).
21 1 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS 346-50
(1965).
22 Bromberg, supra note 9, at 666-67.
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to the agreements described above to prevent classification as profit-
sharing. Moreover, any payments of fixed sums which are readily
related to income are likely subject to the same classification."3
Even payments of fixed sums which are not readily related to
income of the firm are vulnerable, especially when they exceed the
retiring partner's interest in the assets of the partnership.' The
Internal Revenue Code treats liquidation payments in excess of the
retiring partner's interest in the assets of the partnership as ordinary
income rather than as capital gains. Thus, tax authorities consider the
excess to be a measure of future earnings-per se related to income
of the firm-rather than an increase of capital.' To be sure, if the
partners have agreed prior to retirement to establish a value for part-
nership good-will, payments allocated for that sum are allowed cap-
ital-gains treatment.' This point should be considered long before
retirement, and it may prove to be a valuable safeguard in avoiding
profit-sharing classification. However, at least one writer has sum-
marily stated that all continuing payments above the retiring part-
ner's interest in the assets of the partnership constitute profit-sharing. 7
Fixed payments limited to the retiring partner's interest in the
assets of the partnership best withstand profit-sharing classification.
Of course, by definition these payments preclude realization of much
gain on investment if the market value of the partnership assets has
not risen greatly." Moreover, these payments are not totally invul-
nerable. Because of the delay in payments, the partnership can reas-
onably use current profits to meet yearly installments, more so than
if payment were in lump-sum. A liberal extension of profit-sharing
might include any payments which are made from such current
profits.
Perhaps the vital factor to consider in the latter examples is the
" See Annot., 137 A.L.R. 6, 31 (1942).
24 A partner's interest in the partnership itself is the cost of his investment plus his
share of undistributed profits. (Of course if a partner sells his interest the new partner's basis
on purchase is the same as it was to the selling partner.) A partner's interest in the assets
of the partnership is his share of the market value of the specific assets. For the nature of
each interest during the existence of the partnership see §§ 25-26. See also note 54 infra.
The Internal Revenue Service has allowed considerable leeway in valuing a partner's interest
in partnership assets. See Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1 (b) (1) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6832,
1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 33, at 22.
2aTreas. Reg. § 1.736 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6832, 1965 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 33,
at 22, and Bakst, supra note 2. For a general statement of the concept of capital gains as
opposed to ordinary income, see 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4-10 (1958).
26Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b) (3) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6832, 1965 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 33, at 22.
" "The payments may be a fixed sum, or they may be a percentage of past income or of
future income. They all, however, involve one basic concept: the retiring partner is sharing
in the current earnings of the partnership." RABKIN AND JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 346.
21 Partners can raise the stated value of the partnership assets by a reasonable amount.
See note 24, supra.
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conditions of payment. If payments are limited by the firm's profits,
they resemble profit-sharing, fixed or not. On the other hand, if pay-
ments are fixed and mandatory, they are likely to avoid the profit-
sharing classification and to be classed instead as a sharing of gross
29returns.
2
B. The Consequence Of Profit-Sharing
At early common law, the sharing of profits was equated with the
existence of a partnership."0 Under this view, a partner would cer-
tainly remain so after retirement regardless of intention if he con-
tinued to receive a share of the profits. This view, however, has been
repudiated long since3' and has been clearly rejected in Texas as in
most jurisdictions."
The act follows the modern trend, but it nevertheless includes
profit-sharing as a basic element of partnership."3 Moreover, section
7 (4) lists profit-sharing as prima facie evidence of the existence of a
partnership relation, evidence which can be avoided only by proof
that the profits were received as payment for one of the six excep-
tions listed in section 7(4) .a
1. Debt
Section 7 (4) (a) perhaps implies that payments in the retirement
agreement can escape any presumption of partnership continuity
merely because they are payments of an amount owed to the retiring
partner. However, the history behind section 7(4) (a) indicates that
it was meant to protect creditors of debtors in financial difficulties,
2 Section 7 (3) "The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partner-
ship .. " (Emphasis added.)
" Waugh v. Carver, 2 BI. H. 235 (1793); see also Cothran v. Marmaduke & Brown,
60 Tex. 370 (1883); Fouke v. Brengle, 51 S.W. 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.; and
Steger v. Greer, 228 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) error dism., indicating acceptance in
Texas.
"
5 Cox v. Hickman, 8 H.L. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
"
2 Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611 (1892); Wild v. Davenport, 48 N.J. L. 129, 7
Atl. 295 (1886); Fink v. Brown, 215 S.W. 846 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Gardner v. Wes-
ner, 55 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref. See also Sher and Bromberg, supra
note 8, at 264-65.
3 See note 15, supra.
34 Section 7(4):
The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be
drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord,
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner,
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payments vary with the
profits of the business,
(e) As the consideration for the sale of good-will of a business or other
property by installments or otherwise.
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where by permitting continuance of the business, the creditor would
attempt to salvage his debt through profit-sharing."
Modern courts, confronted with the act itself, may expand this
narrow historical scope of debt profit-sharing. Section 42 of the act
indicates that a retiring partner can be a creditor as to profits earned
by the interest he leaves in the partnership." Such express approval
of the retiring partner's creditor status may expand the scope of
section 7 (4) (a) to cover retirement payments.
2. Interest on a Loan
Section 7(4) (d) clearly excuses the lender who agrees to repay-
ment of his principal plus a share in the profits of the borrower's
business." The connection with retirement agreements, however, is
not clear. As suggested by both case law 9 and the existence of sep-
arate subdivisions in section 7 (4), a debt is not always a loan. If the
retirement agreement is to be considered a loan, what is being lent?
Since payments to the retiring partner are usually in cash, money
seems to be the only possible principal for the loan. Moreover, the
retiring partner has not transferred money to the firm; he has trans-
ferred his interest. The transaction is basically then a sale of property
2 Cox v. Hickman, 8 H.L. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860). See also 1 ROWLEY, PART-
NERSHIP 140-42 (1960), and CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 65-66 (1952).
36 Section 42:
When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued under any of
the conditions set forth in section 41 (1, 2, 3, 5, 6) or section 38(2b), with-
out any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person
or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal
representative as against such persons or partnership may have the value of his
interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary
creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partner-
ship with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal representa-
tive, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the
property of the dissolved partnership ...
as At least one writer has indicated that the term "ordinary creditor" may apply only
to the receiving of "an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership
with interest." Williams, supra note 9, at 247-48. Under this interpretation, the retiring
partner in exercising the option to receive profits may fail to achieve creditor status. The
language of the section itself, however, seems to imply the categorizing of both alternatives
under "ordinary creditor." Probably the most grammatical and logical explanation of the
use of the conjunction "or" is that it connects "interest" and "profits," both equally ob-
jects of the preposition "with." Nevertheless, courts would feel little restraint in ruling that
the two clauses follow "shall receive" and that "ordinary creditor" modifies only "an
amount."
"SMeehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611 (1892); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158
N.E. 77 (1927). But compare the following: "Appellee is too preoccupied, we think, with
its insistence that the relationship between [the alleged partners] was that of debtor and
creditor. This is undoubtedly correct, but it is equally undoubtedly indecisive." Minute
Maid Corp. v. United Foods, Inc., 291 F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1961). This case was argued
before final enactment of the act in Texas, but its warning is still appropriate. See note
55 infra and accompanying text.
" Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 21 Barb. 294, 305 (1854). Cf. Heilos v. State
Land Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 239, 116 AtI. 330, 331 involving forbearance of a previous loan.
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for credit. A broad extension of "loan" to include credit is unlikely.
Even if the broad interpretation of "loan" is accepted, the lang-
uage of section 7(4) (d) inherently assumes that only the interest
for the loan is paid through profit-sharing." Unless the retirement
agreement absolutely requires the return of the retiring partner's
interest in the firm in fixed payments," it might fall outside the sec-
tion.
Defense of the retirement agreement solely under 7(4) (d) is then
highly questionable. The retiring partner might well incorporate
both section 7(4) (d) and section 7(4) (a), but some problems of
each individual section (expansion of the scope of "debt" and exist-
ence of a "loan" to calculate interest) do not seem to be answered
merely by combination.
3. Wages of an Employee
If a partner ends all activity in connection with the firm, section
7(4) (b) is irrelevant. Often, however, he will remain as consultant
to the continuing partners and may then seek to show that his serv-
ices were those of an employee. Profit-sharing as compensation to an
employee is not presumptive of partnership liability," but the divi-
sion between employee and partner is not at all clear." Under any
test the retiring partner is at a disadvantage since he was a full part-
ner and is now both performing services and receiving a share of the
profits.4
4. Rent to a Landlord
One writer has stated that section 7 (4) (b) is too narrowly worded
and that profit-sharing as compensation for the use of any property
should be covered. Still, coverage of normal retirement agreements
seems unlikely. The partner by his retirement gives up all interest
in the assets of the firm," and payments for his interest in the part-
nership take the form of sale. In short, the retiring partner has noth-
ing to rent.
40Day v. Cohen, 165 Mass. 304, 43 N.E. 109 (1896), cited in Canadian Ace Brewing
Co. v. Swiftsure Beer Service Co., 17 Il. App. 2d 54, 149 N.E.2d 442, 450 (Ct. App.
1958), and Estate of Moore, 135 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939, 945 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955).
41 See discussion in Starer v. Milwaukee General Ins. Agency, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 268, 121
N.W.2d 872, 874-75 (1963).
" As in agreements following the example in Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution--Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 631, 666. See note 22 supra and accompanying
text.
4aBerne v. Keith, 361 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.
"See Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Rankin, 333 Pa. 412, 5 A.2d 214 (1939).
S See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
4 ROWLEY, supra note 35, at 149.47 Section 41 (3). See also Commissioners' Note, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 231 (1949).
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The partners can alter the normal agreement to perhaps make use
of section 7(4) (b). They can give the retiring partner land or
equipment as payment for his interest in the partnership and then
rent such property from him. Assuming no claims of "sham" trans-
action,48 the retiring partner may share profits as rent.
5. Annuity to a Widow or Representative of a Deceased Partner
Section 7(4) (c) cannot possibly apply to profit-sharing by a
living retiring partner and since the act specifically protects the
estate of the deceased and is silent as to a retiring partner, it may
even give rise to a negative inference of liability of the retiring part-
ner receiving payments. The latter interpretation seems unfair since
the purpose of the section is to protect the decedent's family and
estate, when the widow or representative inadvertently allows the
partnership to continue." The section in connection with section
41 (10)' 0 not only allows the widow or representative to escape lia-
bility but also gives her express protection from harassing law suits.
Such extra protection would not be needed by a living retiring part-
ner and so omission of his situation in the act is perhaps explainable. 1
6. Consideration for the Sale of Good-will of a Business or Other
Property
Payments for the right to continue using the firm name have been
held to be good-will payments," but it is doubtful that an existing
partner owns good-will in order to sell it."' Nevertheless, inclusion
of "other property" in section 7(4) (e) probably offers a retiring
partner his greatest opportunity to avoid any presumption of part-
nership liability.
The retiring partner receives payments for the sale of his interest
48 See note 55, infra. One specific problem is obvious. If the property transfered for the
retiring partner's interest is to be equivalent to the value of that interest and if payments
are to represent adequately the fair rental value of the property, the payments might be ex-
cessive.
" See Western Shoe Co. v. Neumeister, 258 Mich. 662, 242 N.W. 802 (1932), before
the act but expressing the same opinion. The case was cited and analyzed favorably in Van
Stee v. Ransford, 346 Mich. 116, 77 N.W.2d 346, 355 (1956).
5
o Section 41 (10) :
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partner-
ship name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself
make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts
contracted by such person or partnership.
"s See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
" Mitchell v. Gruener, 251 Mass. 113, 146 N.E. 252 (1925).
saSection 25 of the act states generally that partners hold specific partnership property
(which includes good-will) as "tenant(s) in partnership." The provisions of section 25
indicate that no partner owns a part of any asset; the partnership itself owns all assets. Thus,
on liquidation a partner could not sell an asset to the partnership unless he had special rights
in it by prior agreement. For related tax concepts see note 24 supra.
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in the partnership. Sections 26 and 27 declare this interest to be
property owned by the partner and transferable by him. And since
section 7 (4) (e) expressly includes good-will, it is irrelevant for pur-
poses of the section that the property being sold is intangible. No
cases have applied the section to sales between partners, but one
writer in his discussion of annuity payments to widows, indicates his
belief that section 7(4) (e) gives similar protection to retiring part-
54
ners.
C. Preliminary Conclusions On Profit-Sharing
Despite seemingly favorable analysis in previous sections of this
Comment courts have provided little precedent for categorizing the
profit-sharing of retirement agreements under any exception of
section 7(4). Moreover, courts are often inconsistent in finding
partnership liability seemingly in the face of a section 7(4) excep-
tion and in turn denying liability without relying heavily on a sec-
tion 7(4) exception." The standard of "co-ownership"5 often used
to justify the decisions is certainly elusive. Probably the most helpful
standard is that of control; that is, if the parties share profits under
some form of mutual control, they are vulnerable to partnership
classification." However, the amount of control necessary to create a
partnership cannot be stated definitively." Each case carries new fact
situations to be interpreted. The retiring partner should realize his
precarious position and should establish grounds for a section 7(4)
exception and for a showing of lack of control."
III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF RETIREMENT
Payments from the partnership cause unique problems to a former
partner merely because he is a former partner. The most serious
danger is the possibility of estoppel." As explained previously, visible
continuity can perpetuate partnership liability despite the intentions
4"An annuity may also be paid to a retiring partner in consideration of his interest
or a portion of his rights, and this is the subject of a later proviso." (Noting § 7(4)(e))
ROWLEY, supra note 3 5, at 155.
" Compare Berne v. Keith, 361 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e., with
Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Rankin, 333 Pa. 412, 5 A.2d 214 (1939). Also
compare Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927) with Minute Maid Corp. v.
United Foods, Inc., 291 F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1961).
"'See ROWLEY, supra note 35, at 79. Similar in both intention and vagueness is the
phrase "community of interest." ROWLEY, supra at 170.
"See Commissioners' Note, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 11-12 (1949).
s Especially uninviting to definite statements of classification is the comparison of Martin
v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927) with Minute Maid Corp. v. United Foods,
Inc., 291 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1961).
59 See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
0 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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of the parties.61 In addition, signs of economic continuity may also
tend to show visible continuity; thus, where a third party can show
reasonable reliance based on the retiring partner's former status and
continued contact with the partnership through profit-sharing, pros-
pects of partnership liability are imminent."
The existence of an additional ground for liability was implied by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The court denied an executrix of
the estate of a deceased partner recovery of profits earned after the
testator's death because the executrix had not consented to a continua-
tion of the partnership. The opinion reasoned in part that under sec-
tion 4263 the quid pro quo of a share in profits is the subjection of the
retired or deceased partner's interest to the risk of new creditors'
claims." To be sure the court's approach is singular"5 and has been
criticized by writers." Then, too, the language of the opinion dealt
only with the retirement under section 42 and not retirement agree-
ments. However, the existence of such an approach creates a slight
possibility that it will be followed and extended to cover retirement
agreements. At any rate, the retiring partner sharing profits should
be aware of this line of thinking.
IV. CONCLUSIONS - AN OUNCE OF PROTECTION
Partners desiring a complete retirement program should recognize
the possibility of continued liability and should plan accordingly.
Many safeguards can be drafted into the retirement agreement."
The partner's retirement should be stated explicitly. He should re-
lease all rights in partnership assets" to the continuing partnership
and should repudiate all right to control."' He should demand that
" See notes 8 and 11 supra and accompanying text.
62 This is especially true where the retiring partner participates as a consultant, see note
45 supra and accompanying text, or where the new partnership keeps its old name, see note
52 supra and accompanying text.
63 See note 36 supra.
64 It is contended that the statutory plan requiring consent as therein outlined
consistently provides that the quid pro quo is the right to a proportionate share
of the profits of the new partnership if the personal representative so chooses,
for the assumption of the additional risk of claims of the new creditors ...
[I]n that construction we concur.
Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 379-80, 99 A.2d 785, 787-88 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
"sSee specifically M. & C. Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240
(Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd without opinion, 281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1939).
" Note, Profit Rights and Creditors' Priorities after a Partner's Death or Retirement:
Section 42 of the UPA, 63 YALE L.J. 709, 713 (1954).
67 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
68Section 41(3) automatically assumes that rights have been assigned at retirement. Of
course, the purpose of assigning expressly is to prove retirement.
69 See note 58 supra. The court in Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927)
stated the following: "Mere words will not blind us to realities." Martin v. Peyton, supra
at 78. And yet wise drafting was certainly a reason for denial of partnership liability.
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the agreement recite his status as a creditor of the partnership. Fin-
ally, he should have the instrument include specific provisions aimed
at meeting the requirements of the section 7 (4) exception which he
feels is most appropriate and feasible. Certainly 7 (4) (b)' (wages or
rent to landlord) and 7 (4) (e) 7' (payment for good-will or other
property) offer attractive possibilities.
Adequate notice is needed in any retirement," and it is probably
most important where the retiring partner continues receiving pay-
ments from the partnership." Safeguards similar to those included
in the retirement agreement should, a fortiori, be included in the
notice to prospective creditors of the continuing partnership.
Another precaution against estoppel liability involves changing
the balance sheet of the continuing partnership so that it no longer
shows the retiring partner in the capital account. The amount owed
him should be transferred into a liability account. Ideally, the part-
nership will draft a promissory note to increase evidence supporting
his new status as a creditor. Likewise, all liens on partnership prop-
erty should be promptly recorded and noted on the balance sheet.
An indemnification agreement is often used as a protective device.
This agreement allows automatic recovery or at least a personal
action against the continuing partner for amounts the retiring part-
ner must pay for new partnership debts. Since demands on the re-
tiring partner would normally be made after the partnership and
continuing partners had been drained, indemnification without a
third-party guarantee, lien, or escrow account is not of great value.
Retiring partners, in fact, often insist on such security for retire-
ment payments due them as well as for indemnification. 4
A final approach which may be worth considering is the transfer
of the retiring partner to the status of a limited partner. Of course
the new amount of his interest in the partnership is liable to credi-
tors.2 But filing a limited partnership agreement provides extra pro-
tection when creditors try to reach the retiring partner personally.
Where payments are to consist entirely of a percentage of profits
and where the retiring partner wishes to assume a passive advisory
70 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
71 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
72 See notes 8 and 11 supra and accompanying text.
73 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
' See also text accompanying note 48 supra. Express repudiation of control is all the
more important here.
" UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 23.
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role, 6 the limited-partnership approach should be seriously consid-
ered since partnership elements are so prevalent. Where they are not
so prevalent the limited partnership is probably more expensive than
it is worth.
Retirement, then, must be well-planned and well-executed. Al-
though litigation has been scant, dangers of continued liability await
the partner who continues to receive payments from his former firm
without taking precautions. No set of rules has been established as
yet, but, of course, the wise businessman avoids becoming the test
case to establish the rules. A retiring partner should realize the pos-
sible dangers and should take the extra effort necessary to avoid
liability.
"'Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act indicates that the limited partner
will be liable personally to creditors if he "takes part in the control of the business." Section
4 indicates that any services put him in danger. Certainly a controlling interest would make
him a full partner. Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
But courts have allowed limited activity without establishing partnership liability. Plasteel
Products Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
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